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Recent Decisions
COPYRIGHT-INFRINGEMENT-PUBLIC PERFORMANCE FOR PROFIT
-RADIO RECEPTION AS PERFORMANCE-The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that reception of a licensed radio broadcast
of copyrighted musical compositions in a commercial establishment
where the compositions are heard by the public does not constitute
copyright infringement because it is not a "performance" within the
meaning of the copyright law.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
George Aiken owned and operated a chain of "fast food" estab-
lishments which supplied food for take out orders and for consump-
tion in the restaurant. Aiken provided background music for the
customers and employees in the restaurant by means of a radio
receiver and several loudspeakers placed in various areas of the
restaurant ceiling. News, commercial advertising and other normal
radio programming were received with the music. On March 11,
1972, radio broadcasts of two musical compositions were received
and transmitted through the multiple loudspeakers in the
restaurant to members of the public present as patrons of Aiken's
establishment. Both compositions were subjects of copyright.' The
copyright owners were members of the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), 2 an association which li-
censes the performing rights in the copyrighted compositions of its
members.' The broadcast received by Aiken originated from a local
1. The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
Congress exercised this power in enacting the Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909),
as amended 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), providing that the copyright owner shall have the exclusive
right to publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work; to translate or make other versions
thereof; to present the copyrighted work in public for profit, or make a record thereof by which
it may be presented or reproduced; to perform the copyrighted work publicly, if a drama; and
"[to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition.
Id. § 1(e).
2. For a discussion of ASCAP see K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1967) and Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. ASCAP, 187 U.S.P.Q. 431 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
3. A license grants a licensee the copyright owner's permission to perform a copyrighted
composition. The licensee's performance, therefore, does not infringe the copyright owner's
exclusive right to perform the composition publicly for profit under 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1970).
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station which was licensed by ASCAP to broadcast these and other
musical compositions.' Aiken was not licensed by ASCAP and
therefore was not authorized to perform the copyrighted works.
The copyright owners brought suit against Aiken in federal dis-
trict court to recover for copyright infringement.' The issue was
whether the reception in Aiken's restaurant of a licensed radio
broadcast of plaintiffs' copyrighted works infringed plaintiffs' exclu-
sive rights under the Copyright Act of 1909.6 The district court held
that Aiken had infringed plaintiffs' copyrights by unlawfully per-
forming the copyrighted works publicly for profit.7 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Aiken's conduct
did not constitute copyright infringement because it was not a "per-
formance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act.8 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari9 to consider the question
"whether the reception of a radio broadcast of a copyrighted musical
composition can constitute copyright infringement, when the copy-
right owner licensed the broadcaster to perform the composition
publicly for profit."'" The Court held that there was no "perform-
ance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and hence no in-
fringement, by one who merely received a radio broadcast."
4. The license agreement gave the licensee no authority to grant any further rights to
reproduce or perform the copyrighted works and expressly negated any implication that a
broadcast receiver would be authorized to reproduce or perform the copyrighted works pub-
licly for profit. The exact language of the relevant portion of the contract between ACSAP
and the radio station is set out in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp.
271, 273 n.l (W.D. Pa. 1973).
5. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
6. Id. at 272. See note 1 supra.
7. Id. at 274-75.
8. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974). The parties did
not dispute that the radio reception occurred publicly, nor did Aiken seriously contend that
the purpose was not for profit. Id. at 130 n.7. The sole issue was whether the reception of the
licensed broadcast constituted "performance."
9. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 419 U.S. 1067 (1974).
10. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 152 (1975). The fact that the
radio reception occurred publicly and for profit was not disputed. See note 8 supra. The Court
discussed the question, however, citing Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917),
which held that a hotel owner or restauranteur who employed an orchestra which played
copyrighted musical compositions for the entertainment of patrons infringed the exclusive
right of the copyright owner to perform the work publicly for profit. Although there was no
charge for the musical entertainment, it was part of the total for which the public paid. The
Court concluded that "the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is enough." Id. at 595.
The issue in Aiken was thus narrowed to the precise question whether radio reception under
the facts in the case constituted a "performance" of the copyrighted work within the meaning
of the Copyright Act. 422 U.S. at 157.
11. 422 U.S. at 161-62.
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The Court in Aiken drew an analogy between a live performance,
as contemplated by the authors of the Copyright Act," and a radio
broadcast performance, as determined by the case law. 3 The Court
observed that if a radio station which broadcast the copyrighted
works performed by analogy to a singer or an orchestra, then one
who received the broadcast, by analogy to a member of a live audi-
ence, did not perform.' 4 In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., a
hotel proprietor was held to have performed by receiving radio
broadcasts of copyrighted works. However, the broadcaster in
Jewell-LaSalle was not licensed"6 by the copyright owners to per-
form their compositions, and the Court treated Jewell-LaSalle as
limited to its facts.1 7
The Court based its decision that there was no performance in
Aiken on the concept of performance as defined in two recent cases,
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists" and Teleprompter Corp. v.
CBS, 9 which the Court interpreted as expressly excluding from the
scope of performance under the Copyright Act the reception of an
electronic broadcast when the broadcaster is licensed to perform the
copyrighted compositions.2 1
12. The Court observed that the purpose behind the Copyright Act when it was enacted
in 1909 was to prohibit unauthorized live performances for profit, such as performances by
orchestras and singers in public places like theaters and restaurants. In light of the develop-
ment of modem methods of mass communication, however, the judiciary has interpreted the
Copyright Act broadly in appropriate circumstances to prevent exploitation of copyrighted
works by new and different technological means such as radio. Id. at 157-58.
13. For example, in Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d
411 (6th Cir. 1925) the court reasoned that a radio broadcast is no less a public performance
because the listeners are not congregated in a public place; nor is it any more a private
performance because the listeners are entertained in the privacy of their homes. Id. at 412.
See Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1944); M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923).
14. 422 U.S. at 158-60, citing Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929) (one
who merely actuates electrical instrumentalities whereby inaudible elements in the air are
made audible does not "perform"); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Elec. Co., 16 F.2d
829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (those who listen do not perform, and therefore do not infringe).
15. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
16. See note 3 supra.
17. 422 U.S. at 160. Presumably the Court considered dispositive the fact that the broad-
cast intercepted by the hotel receiver in JeweU-LaSalle was not authorized by the copyright
owner. In the Jewell-LaSalle opinion, Justice Brandeis noted that a license for commercial
reception and distribution might possibly have been implied if the original broadcast had
been licensed. 283 U.S. at 199 n.5.
18. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
19. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
20. 422 U.S. at 160-61. Both cases involved television as the medium and literary or
Duquesne Law Review
The issue in Fortnightly was whether the owner and operator of a
community antenna television system (CATV)21 infringed the per-
forming rights of the copyright owner by intercepting and transmit-
ting broadcast signals of copyrighted motion pictures which the
broadcaster was licensed to perform.2 The Court held that there was
no infringement because the owner of the CATV system did not
perform the copyrighted works within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.23 The Court compared the functions of broadcasters and view-
ers and drew a line 4 between broadcasters who performed the active
functions of selecting, procuring, and editing programs and propa-
gating them to the public, and viewers who were passive beneficiar-
ies of the performance. The Fortnightly Court concluded that under
this functional analysis CATV fell on the viewer's side of the line
and therefore did not perform within the meaning of the Copyright
Act. 5 In Teleprompter, the CATV system not only transmitted
broadcast signals beyond the range of the original broadcaster, but
also independently originated some programs, sold advertising time
and interconnected with other CATV systems. The Court held that
neither the distance over which intercepted signals were transmit-
ted nor the development of new functions, historically considered to
be broadcasters' functions, changed the non-performer status of a
CATV system with respect to retransmission of intercepted broad-
cast signals. 6 In view of these decisions, the Aiken Court applied the
functional test and held that if the elaborate and sophisticated tech-
dramatic works as the copyrighted subject matter; however, the Court in Aiken concluded
that the concept of performance defined therein applied equally to radio and musical compo-
sitions. Id. at 161-62.
21. The CATV system operated by intercepting television broadcast signals from the air
and transmitting them by coaxial cables to television sets in the homes of its subscribers. For
a more detailed discussion of CATV see United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157 (1968) (upholding authority of FCC to regulate CATV); M. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
(1965). Regulation of CATV is discussed in Note, Regulation of Community Antenna
Television, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1970); Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79
HARV. L. REV. 366 (1965).
22. 392 U.S. at 395-96. Regarding CATV and copyright liability see Comment, CA TVand
Copyright Liability, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1514 (1967); Comment, CATVand Copyright Liability:
On A Clear Day You Can See Forever, 52 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1966); Comment, Cable TVand
Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J. 554 (1974).
23. 392 U.S. at 401-02. The Court in Fortnightly found that for purposes of copyright
liability broadcasters perform and viewers do not. Id. at 398.
24. Id. at 398-99.
25. Id. at 402.
26. 415 U.S. at 405.
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nological functions of Fortnightly and Teleprompter did not consti-
tute performance, then "logic dictates that no 'performance' re-
sulted when [Aiken] merely activated his restaurant radio." 7 The
Court observed that a contrary result would have offended the prin-
ciple of stare decisis by overruling Fortnightly and Teleprompter"5
and would have created "wholly unenforceable and highly inequita-
ble" 9 copyright law. 3"
The decision in Aiken completed the reversal of a judicial trend
to expand protection of the copyright owner's performance rights
which had developed from the enactment of the Copyright Act in
1909 to the Fortnightly decision in 1968. During that period, courts
consistently expressed the view that the Copyright Act, enacted
when radio was new and television not yet in existence, should be
revised by the legislature to deal expressly with modern communi-
27. 422 U.S. at 161-62, citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 137
(3d Cir. 1974).
28. 422 U.S. at 162.
29. Id. at 162-63. The Court felt that any effort by copyright holders to obtain and enforce
licensing agreements with a substantial percentage of the countless business establishments
which operate radio or television sets on their premises would be futile. Holding that reception
of a radio broadcast constituted performance was considered inequitable because the receiver
could never be fully protected from copyright infringement; even if he secured a license from
ASCAP, he might receive a broadcast of a composition copyrighted by a nonmember of
ASCAP. Further, including broadcast reception within the scope of performance would have
authorized the sale of multiple licenses for what the Court considered a single public perform-
ance of the copyrighted work.
30. Justice Blackmun accepted the authority of Fortnightly and Teleprompter and con-
curred in the result, but expressed threefold discomfort with the majority's decision. Factual
discomfort arose from the majority's characterization of Aiken as an innocent listener in view
of the several loudspeakers which he had installed to make the broadcasts available for the
entertainment of his customers. Precedential discomfort resulted from the extension of the
CATV cases to a radio case; this disrupted business practices established while Jewell-
LaSalle was a benchmark in copyright law and the foundation for much of the licensing
structure by which ASCAP grants, and commercial establishments pay for, licenses to use a
radio with multiple loudspeakers. Finally, tactical discomfort stemmed from the majority's
reluctance to expressly overrule Jewell-LaSalle, which was viable and strong opposing preced-
ent to the holding of the majority. Id. at 164-67 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In a dissenting
opinion joined by Justice Douglas, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the need for legislative
action to update the Copyright Act. Until such action was taken, however, he felt the Court
should strive to preserve traditional copyright concepts and business relationships such as
those founded upon the Jewell-LaSalle decision. The result reached by the majority was not
compelled by the language of the Copyright Act, which did not define performance; nor was
it dicated by the Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions, which could properly have been
limited to CATV. Moreover, the decision of the majority was contrary to controlling case law,
i.e., the unanimous and unequivocal holding of the Court in Jewell-LaSalle that when one
receives a radio braodcast for his own commercial purposes, he necessarily assumes the risk
that he may infringe the performing rights of another. Id. at 167-70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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cation and reproduction technology.3 1 However, the courts did not
forbear legislative inaction at the expense of copyright protection; 32
rather, they considered each new technological achievement in light
of the purpose of the Copyright Act3 to determine if it represented
a new means for performing the copyrighted work. Courts expanded
the concept of performance under the Copyright Act to include the
playing of a phonograph record, 34 the playing of a piano roll, 35 and
radio broadcasting.36 The last significant expansion of the concept
of performance was the Supreme Court's decision in Jewell-LaSalle,
where a hotel proprietor's reception of a radio broadcast was held
to constitute a performance of a copyrighted work. This expansion
was halted by the holding of the Supreme Court that there was no
performance in the CATV cases. Whatever policy considerations
might have existed to warrant a CATV exception37 to the rule of
performance established by Jewell-LaSalle, the hope that
Fortnightly and Teleprompter would be limited to CATV was extin-
guished by the Court's decision in Aiken, which limits copyright
protection to the performance by a broadcaster and does not appear
to recognize any subsequent acts as performance.
The facts in Aiken are nearly identical to the facts in Jewell-
LaSalle.38 The Jewell-LaSalle decision that radio reception consti-
tuted a performance 31 would dictate a finding that the radio recep-
31. The Supreme Court itself expressed the need for copyright revision legislation in
Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 414; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396 n.17, 401; Jewell-LaSalle, 283
U.S. at 199 n.6.
32. E.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.
1925) (until the copyright law is revised by Congress to define the rights of composers,
producers, performers and the public, the court can decide how, fairly construed, the current
law applies to new technological situations).
33. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). Congress intended to frame the
Copyright Act so that it would secure to the composer an adequate return for the value of
his composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies. How-
ever, the main object in expanding copyright protection for music was to give the composer
an adequate return for all use of his composition. Id.
34. Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929); Buck v. Heretis, 24 F.2d 876
(E.D.S.C. 1928).
35. Buck v. Lester, 24 F.2d 877 (E.D.S.C. 1928).
36. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.
1925).
37. 422 U.S. at 166 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguably desirable effect of protecting
infant CATV industry from premature death).
38. As in Jewell-LaSalle, Aiken received radio broadcasts and converted them into audi-
ble sounds for the entertainment of members of the public in his commercial establishment.
39. 283 U.S. at 198.
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tion by Aiken constituted a performance which, being unlicensed,
violated the copyright owners' exclusive right to perform the work
publicly for profit. The only significant distinction between the two
cases is that the broadcaster in Jewell-LaSalle was not licensed to
perform the copyrighted works. However, this difference does not
justify a finding that Aiken did not perform.4" Since Jewell-LaSalie
has not been overruled, the Court in Aiken should have acknowl-
edged that Jewel-LaSalle expanded the scope of performance to
include the reception of radio broadcasts, at least for commercial
purposes,4' and found, therefore, that Aiken's reception of the
broadcast was a performance. Instead, the Aiken Court emphasized
that the ultimate result in Jewel-LaSalle might have been different
had the broadcaster been licensed.4 2 This conclusion ignored the
reasoning of Jewell-LaSalle, where the Court unanimously held that
the hotel proprietor's acts constituted "performance." Comments
on the licensing status of the broadcaster bore on the question of
infringement, not performance." Since the broadcaster in Jewell-
LaSalle was not authorized to perform, however, the decision that
the hotel proprietor's acts constituted performance was tantamount
to finding infringement. The Court's observations on licensing45 left
open the question whether the copyright owner, by authorizing a
40. Dictum in Jewell-LaSalle indicated that if the broadcaster had been licensed by the
copyright owners to perform their compositions a license might have been implied for the
reception of the broadcast, and the hotel receiver might therefore have been excepted from
copyright liability. Id. at 199 n.5. However, it is clear if the Court in Jewell-LaSalle had
reached a different result in a case where the broadcaster was licensed, it would have done
so on the theory that an implied license authorized the performance by the receiver rather
than because there was no performance. Although the broadcaster in Aiken was licensed, the
licensing agreement expressly negated the implication of a license to any broadcast receiver.
See Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19
F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (copyright infringement depends on receiver's acts, not broad-
caster's rights).
41. While the Court in Jewell-LaSalle did not expressly hold that radio reception in a
private home constituted performance, it noted that the owner of a private radio who received
broadcasts in his home would not be liable for infringement because his reception was neither
public nor for profit. 283 U.S. at 196. This dictum indicates that reception in general consti-
tutes performance, while reception for commercial purposes amounts to infringement.
42. 422 U.S. at 160 n.10.
43. 283 U.S. at 198.
44. A performance authorized by the copyright owner does not infringe his exclusive right
to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit.
45. The Jewell-LaSalle Court's comments on licensing strengthened its holding regarding
performance, because the issue of implied license is relevant only after performance has been
established.
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broadcaster to perform, impliedly licensed a performance by anyone
who received the broadcast. The remarks in Jewell-LaSalle" re-
garding the possibility of noninfringement by reception of a licensed
broadcast do not diminish its weight as opposing precedent to the
decision in Aiken, for although the broadcast received by Aiken was
licensed, the license agreement expressly negated any implication
of a license for a broadcast receiver.
The Court's application of the functional analysis of Fortnightly
in Aiken has two weaknesses. The first i's that there is no justifica-
tion for applying to radio a test developed for CATV. 47 The factual
differences between CATV and radio argue against equating the two
operations for the purpose of determining performance. Were the
Jewell-LaSalie concept of performance applied in each case, it
would be reasonable to find no performance in a CATV case and still
find performance in Aiken. In the opinion of the Jewell-LaSalle
Court, the translation of a radio broadcast reception into audible
sound was a reproduction, not a mere audition, of the original pro-
gram4" and amounted to a separate performance." Applying this
reasoning to the CATV cases, the Court could have found there was
no performance on the grounds that the CATV system did not ren-
der the copyrighted works visible or audible. If exemption of CATV
from copyright liability was the desired result, this application of
Jewell-LaSalle would have obtained that result while satisfying the
principle of stare decisis.
The second weakness is inherent in the Fortnightly functional
analysis. The major premise that viewers do not perform 0 is plainly
contrary to the rule of performance established by Jewell-LaSalle.'
Even accepting the Court's limitation of Jewell-LaSalle, the
Fortnightly functional test is clearly inadequate to determine the
issue of performance in Aiken. The Fortnightly test dealt with the
categories of broadcasters and viewers; the Court disposed of the
46. 283 U.S. at 198, 199 n.5.
47. Exemption from copyright liability for the intercepting and relaying of television
broadcasts by CATV systems does not require exemption of similar acts by radio receivers.
See M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 107.44 (1976). Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (upholding
exemption of professional baseball from antitrust laws although no other professional sport
is exempt).
48. 283 U.S. at 199-200.
49. Id. at 201.
50. 392 U.S. at 398.
51. 283 U.S. at 198.
Vol. 14: 739
Recent Decisions
CATV issue of performance by determining that CATV, which was
neither a broadcaster nor a viewer, was like a viewer in the func-
tional sense.5" The Fortnightly test does not provide any criteria for
determining whether there is a performance by one who, like Aiken,
was obviously a "viewer" in the ordinary sense that he heard the
broadcast, but who was also responsible for making an audible re-
production of the broadcast available to the public for his own
profit. The Fortnightly functional analysis would evaluate the acts
of an alleged infringer to determine whether, viewed in their en-
tirety, these acts resemble more the functions of broadcasters or the
functions of viewers. If the latter, there would be no performance
because "viewers do not perform. ' '53 Such an analysis begs the es-
sential question: whether any specific act or sequence of acts consti-
tutes a performance. Assuming arguendo that Aiken, like CATV,
"falls on the viewer's side of the line"54 dividing broadcasters from
viewers does not answer the question whether Aiken's act of receiv-
ing a radio broadcast and making it audible to members of the
public in his commercial establishment constituted a performance.
Acceptance of the Court's finding in Fortnightly does not require
the abandonment of Jewell-LaSalle. Aside from the technological
differences between CATV and radio, the facts of the two cases are
distinguishable.5 The Court in Fortnightly did not express or imply
an intent to overrule Jewell-LaSalle. Indeed, the two decisions may
be harmonized by observing that Jewell-LaSalle did not impose
copyright liability upon the hotel guests, the "viewers" in that case,
but only upon the hotel which rendered an unauthorized perform-
ance of the copyrighted works. Since Fortnightly holds that CATV
does not perform the broadcasts it transmits, without defining per-
formance or proposing an adequate test for determining whether or
not specific acts constitute a performance, Fortnightly should be
limited to its facts. 5 Certainly it should not be applied to a case
52. 392 U.S. at 398-401.
53. Id. at 398.
54. Id. at 399.
55. In Fortnightly, the CATV system was a commercial operation which enhanced the
reception ability of its subscribers, who were the ultimate and intended broadcast receivers.
In Jewell-LaSalle, the hotel was the broadcast receiver, which appropriated the broadcast to
its own commercial purposes.
56. By employing the Fortnightly test in Aiken, the Court extended the concept of per-
formance established by Fortnightly for a particular factual situation, 392 U.S. at 399 n.25,
and expanded by Teleprompter to cover the entire field of CATV operations, 415 U.S. at 412-
13, into the area of radio operations already occupied by Jewell-LaSalle.
1976
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such as Aiken which is obviously within the bounds of Jewell-
LaSalle.
The Court in Aiken feared that a scope of performance which
included the acts of those who merely operated a broadcast receiv-
ing set in their commercial establishments would result in unen-
forceable copyright law. The Court felt any effort to license the
countless business establishments which operate television and
radio sets on their premises would be futile. However, difficulty in
enforcing a right is hardly justification for abrogating itA1 Moreover,
the efforts of ASCAP to license such establishments have not been
futile."8 The Court also feared that finding a radio listener performed
the broadcasts he received would be inequitable because a listener
could not assure himself of freedom from copyright liability. The
Court was concerned that even if a listener obtained a license from
ASCAP, he might receive a broadcast of a musical composition the
copyright owner of which was not a member of ASCAP, and thereby
inadvertently infringe. This same risk, however, is taken by a broad-
caster who obtains a license from ASCAP and is held liable if he
inadvertently infringes by broadcasting the copyrighted work of a
nonmember. More importantly, an ordinary radio listener is free
from copyright liability, even though his reception would constitute
performance under Jewell-LaSalie, because the performance is nei-
ther public nor for profit.5" Thus it is only the entrepreneur who
appropriates the broadcast reception for his own commercial use
who must assure freedom from copyright liability by acquiring a
license to perform." Finally, the Court reasoned that a finding of
57. One should not be required to enforce a right perfectly or else suffer the loss of the
right. The difficulty of enforcing the performance right defined by Jewell-LaSalle was recog-
nized by the court in Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York
Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). But not until Aiken was the ease of
enforcing the resulting performance right considered relevant to determining the scope of
performance.
58. The court of appeals in Aiken noted that ASCAP had licensed some 5150 business
establishments through the country. These licensees paid $246,000 annually in royalty pay-
ments. 500 F.2d at 129. Whether these figures represent a substantial percentage of the
potential licensing market and whether the effort to license is evenhanded are not relevant
to the issue of performance.
59. See 283 U.S. at 196.
60. The Court in Aiken acknowledged that an entrepreneur infringed by sponsoring a
public performance for profit, but noted that members of the audience who heard the compo-
sition did not perform and therefore did not infringe. 422 U.S. at 157. However, the Court
decided that Aiken was not such an entrepreneur, but rather was in the same position as a
member of the audience. Id. at 159.
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performance under the circumstances in Aiken would authorize the
sale of multiple licenses for a single rendition of a copyrighted work.
But multiple licensing is authorized under the multiple perform-
ance theory of Jewell-LaSalle." Such multiple tribute is not "at
odds '6 2 with the balanced congressional purpose behind the copy-
right protection of the exclusive right to perform, since one aspect
of that purpose is "securing to the composer an adequate return for
all use made of his compositon." 3
Neither statute nor precedent dictated the result in Aiken. Fur-
thermore, the Court's decision to limit copyright protection by con-
tracting the scope of performance conflicts with the legislative trend
regarding revision of the copyright law.64 The copyright revision
legislation recently passed by Congress 5 substantially expands
copyright protection of the exclusive right to perform copyrighted
works.66 The revised copyright law includes a broad definition of
performance 7 and provides a licensing fee schedule for CATV,6 '
extends copyright protection to sound recordings,6 and eliminates
the "jukebox exemption."70 It is difficult to understand why the
61. 283 U.S. at 197-98. The Jewell-LaSalle "multiple performance" theory, simply stated,
is that the language of the Copyright Act does not prohibit finding that a single rendition of
a copyrighted work results in more than one public performance for profit. See Comment,
Copyrights and TV-A New Use For the Multiple Performance Theory, 18 U. CHi. L. REv.
757 (1951).
62. 422 U.S. at 163.
63. H.R. RP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (emphasis added).
64. Proposed copyright revision bills noted in Teleprompter and Fortnightly dealt specifi-
cally with CATV. 415 U.S. at 414 n.16; 392 U.S. at 396 n.17. By the time of the Court's
decision in Aiken, an attempt had been made to distinguish the use of an ordinary radio from
the transmission of broadcasts by means of loudspeakers to a substantial audience. 422 U.S.
at 169 nn.2 & 3.
65. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
66. Id. § 106(4) grants to the copyright owner the exclusive right to perform a copyrighted
musical work publicly.
67. Id. § 101. Although not dealt with expressly in the copyright revision legislation, radio
reception appears to fall within the definition of "perform." By controlling the radio set, the
broadcast receiver may "render" or "play" the composition to an audience. Alternatively, the
broadcast receiver may "transmit or otherwise communicate a performance" of a copyrighted
work "by *means of a device or process" to "a place open to the public." Such acts constitute
a public performance according to the copyright revision legislation. Id. Although certain
performances are exempt from the copyright owner's exclusive rights, Aiken's multiple loud-
speaker system would disqualify him from the most nearly appropriate exemption for commu-
nication by public reception of a transmission on a "single receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly used in private homes." Id. § 110(5).
68. Id. § 111.
69. Id. § 114.
70. Id. § 116. Predicting that the "jukebox" would be a commercially insignificant, short-
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Court in Aiken relied on precedents which legislation would
effectively overrule7 to reach a decision contrary to the traditional
policy of expansive copyright protection of the performance right.
Donna L. Seidel
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION-STANDING TO
CHALLENGE RESTRICTIVE ZONING ORDINANCES-The Supreme Court of
the United States has held that minority nonresidents lack standing
to attack a town zoning ordinance where they cannot show that but
for the ordinance they could have obtained affordable housing, or
that if granted relief they would benefit.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
The zoning ordinance of the town of Penfield, a suburb of Roches-
ter, New York, allocated ninety-eight percent of its vacant land to
single-family detached dwellings and contained minimum lot size,
set back, floor area and habitable space requirements which were
allegedly unreasonable. Petitioners sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief and damages, maintaining that this ordinance, coupled
with the refusals of Penfield's Zoning, Planning and Town Boards
to grant variances, resulted in an almost total absence of affordable
housing for low and moderate income minority persons.
The original plaintiffs were nonresident minority persons with low
or moderate incomes, individual taxpayers of Rochester, and Metro-
Act, a nonprofit association promoting improved low and moderate
income housing in the Rochester area whose membership included
Penfield residents. Rochester Home Builders (Home Builders), rep-
resenting area construction firms, and the Housing Council in the
Monroe County Area, Inc. (Housing Council) unsuccessfully at-
lived novelty, Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1947 so that the reproduction or
rendition of a copyrighted musical composition on a coin-operated machine would not consti-
tute a public performance for profit unless a fee were charged for admission to the place where
the performance occurred. Under the revised copyright law, the proprietor of an establish-
ment who operates such a phonorecord player is liable for infringement unless he obtains a
license to perform the work publicly.
71. Passage of the copyright revision legislation, which expressly treats CATV as public
performance, effectively overrules Fortnightly and Teleprompter and certainly undermines
Aiken.
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